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Abstract. This paper illustrates the effect of BBBEE on good corporate governance. 
Corporate governance and specifically directors’ duties relating to stakeholder protection are 
focused on. Traditionally, directors are expected to manage a company in the best interests of the 
shareholders collectively. The question arises as to whether directors should also consider the 
interests of other stakeholders, inter alia employees, creditors, the environment and the 
community. The South African Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, not 
only aims at correcting racial imbalances, but also strives to promote social investment and the 
empowerment of communities. By adhering to this act, directors will by implication consider the 
interests of the community and give effect to the triple-bottom line approach when managing a 
company. This paper will illustrate the unique dynamics of corporate governance in South Africa.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, South Africa, broad based black economic empowerment, stakeholders, 
triple-bottom line approach. 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Directors are expected to manage a company in the best interests of the shareholders collectively. This traditional 
view is increasingly being questioned. There is pressure on companies and directors to take into account not only 
the shareholders when they manage a company, but rather the interests of all stakeholders, such as employees, 
creditors, consumers, suppliers, the environment and the community. This consideration for the interests of other 
stakeholders is known as corporate social responsibility.1 
In the South African legal sphere, there is specific legislation which compels companies to take the 
interests of certain stakeholders into account. This is, for example evident in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995; the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000; and the Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (hereafter the BBBEE Act). The South African BBBEE Act, not only aims to 
correct racial imbalances, but also strives to promote social investment and the empowerment of communities. 
This paper will discuss the impact of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) on corporate 
governance in South Africa. 
This paper will illustrate how, through BBBEE legislation, directors are compelled to consider the 
community as a stakeholder and to manage a company to its benefit as well. 
The first section of this article defines corporate social responsibility. The discussion of social 
responsibility is followed by a discussion of directors’ duties and specifically addresses the question in whose 
interests they should manage a company. The traditional position in South Africa concerning the beneficiaries of 
directors’ duties, the King II Report,2 the Policy Document3 on company law reform, as well as the recent 
Companies Bill are focused on.  
 
                                                          
∗  This article was first published in Kierkegaard, Sylvia (2008) Business and Law: Theory and Practice. IAITL. pp. 94-111. 
1 This is discussed in more detail in par 2 infra.  
2 See King Report II on Corporate Governance for South Africa, Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (2002) (hereafter 
the King II Report). 
3 Policy Document of the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI): The Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, 
South African Company Law Reform for a 21st Century, (May 2004) (hereafter the Policy Document). 
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In the second part of this article the South African BBBEE Act is considered and it is explained how this 
Act addresses racial imbalances and promotes social investment. Even though social responsibility traditionally  
concerns voluntary initiatives by companies, it is indicated that legislation can be used as a tool to enhance 
corporate governance in companies. It is argued below that law plays an increasing role in enforcing corporate 
social responsibility policies.4 
 
2.   Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Social, safety, health and environmental factors have been introduced as important factors that company 
management must have regard to. Since this article deals with the consideration of social aspects when directors 
manage a company it is important to understand the concept of corporate social responsibility. In essence, it 
relates to the consideration of the interests of different stakeholders. A company is said to be socially responsible 
when directors manage it in such a way that the company “voluntarily expends its resources to do something not 
required by law and without immediate economic benefits”.5 According to Parkinson “[E]very large corporation 
should be thought of as a social enterprise, that is, an entity whose existence and decisions can be justified only 
in as far as they serve public or social purposes.” 6 Parkinson suggests that company directors should take some 
social responsibility for the decisions they make when managing a company. The behavior of companies should 
reflect an increased sensitivity to the impact of the company’s activities on third parties. He refers to this 
suggestion as “profit-sacrificing social responsibility”.7 However, he does state that “profit-sacrificing social 
responsibility” may lead to an increase in profitability over the long term.8 Parkinson believes that the duty of 
directors and the internal structures of major companies should be altered to take account of stakeholders’ 
interests beyond that required of directors in terms of the law.9  
The above mentioned assumption that corporate social responsibility is voluntary and that it relates to a 
company extending it resources to do what is not required by law merits further attention. The role of legislation 
and other forces in facilitating socially responsible conduct is considered by McBarnet. First she states that 
various external and market forces compel companies to act in a socially responsible manner beyond that 
required of them in terms of legislation. These forces include pressure on companies by non-governmental 
organizations to adopt socially responsible policies and protests by civil societies against certain practices of 
companies (for example the campaign against Nike and their use of cheap labor).10 
She then argues that the law also plays an important role in enforcing socially responsible behavior. 
Governments foster corporate social responsibility through indirect regulation.11 McBarnet therefore concludes 
that corporate social responsibility can no longer be seen as a mere voluntary act: “what is emerging in the area 
of CSR [corporate social responsibility] is a complex interaction between government, business and civil 
society…”.12 
 
 
                                                          
4 See par 2 infra. See also Doreen McBarnet, Voiculescu A & Campbell T (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law, in “The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the Law” (2007) on this issue. 
5 Our emphasis. See Lionel Hodes, The Social Responsibility of a Company, 100 South African Law Journal 468 (1983). See 
also McBarnet supra at 1 where it is stated that corporate social responsibility includes a shift of corporate responsibility from 
profit maximization for the shareholders within the obligations of the law to responsibility to a broader range of stakeholders. 
It is a shift from the “bottom line” to the “triple-bottom line”.  
6 John E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility Issues in the Theory of Company Law (1993) 23 Claredon Press 
Oxford where he quotes Robert A Dahl, A Prelude to Corporate Reform, in Robert L Heilbroner, London P (eds) “Corporate 
Social Policy” 18 (1975). 
7 Parkinson supra 260 ff. 
8 Parkinson supra 261. 
9 This will have the effect of corporate socially responsible conduct no longer be defined as voluntary conduct, where 
companies do more than what is expected of them in terms of the law. 
10 McBarnet supra at 4ff.  
11 The pension regulation in the United Kingdom is an example in point. This legislation requires pension companies to state 
how they complied with social, environmental and ethical issues. It does not oblige companies to consider social, 
environmental and ethical issues when making business decisions, but merely requires them to disclose whether they did so 
(see the Pension Act of 1995). This disclosure requirement was added to the Act in July 2000. See also s 172(1) of the United 
Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 which requires directors to have regard to a number of factors (like the interests of 
employees and the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment) when managing a company. 
However, it is within the directors’ discretion whether to consider these factors or not. 
12 McBarnet supra at 37. 
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With legislation indirectly compelling companies to act in a socially responsible manner one can no 
longer refer to corporate social responsibility as consisting only of voluntary actions. If corporate social 
responsibility is still regarded as a voluntary act and legislation compels companies to act socially responsible  
what would companies have to do to act socially responsible? Do they have to do more than what the legislation 
compels them to do? But what is “more than compelled by legislation” and how does one predict it? We propose  
a definition of corporate social responsibility that also takes legislation which indirectly compels directors to act 
socially responsible into account. Thus,  corporate social responsibility should rather be aimed at social conduct 
where stakeholders’ interests are taken into account be it by way of indirect legislation or by way of voluntary 
conduct.13  
In the next section, the  duties of the directors  are considered in order to determine the extent of  the 
social  concerns they are allowed to consider in order to cause the company to act in a socially responsible 
manner. 
 
3. Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in terms of South African Company Law 
 
In terms of South African company law,  the fiduciary duties of directors are categorized into separate sub-
duties. These include acting with an unfettered discretion, for a proper purpose, within the limits of powers 
conferred upon the particular director and without a conflict of interest. All these duties form part of one 
overriding duty, namely to act in good faith for the company as a whole.14 The interpretation thus far has been 
that the duties of directors should be exercised in the best interests of the company. The concept of “a company 
as a whole” relates to shareholders “collectively”, “all the shareholders, present and future”, and the company as 
a “separate legal entity.”15 Directors must act in good faith in the interests of the company seen as the interests of 
the shareholders collectively.16  
There has, however, been a shift in public opinion towards the recognition of a wider variety of interests, 
which should be considered in addition to those of the shareholders.17 The wider variety of interests includes, 
inter alia, those of the following stakeholders: investors, employees, consumers, the general public, and the 
environment. This article focuses on the community at large as a stakeholder. The interest of the wider 
community is served by BBBEE in light of past discrimination under Apartheid. As a stakeholder, the 
community has an interest in the way the company is managed by the directors. If it is managed to address 
existing racial imbalances in the economy and encourage socio-economic upliftment, the best interests of the 
community will be served. This exhibits the characteristics of good corporate governance by being sensitive to 
the impact of the company’s decisions on the South African society.  
Two important schools of thought have developed in response to the question in whose interest the 
company should be managed, namely the enlightened-shareholder value and pluralist approaches.18 In the 
enlightened-shareholder value approach,  the primary role of the directors is seen as promoting the success of the 
company for the benefit of the company as a whole and to generate maximum value for shareholders.19 The 
second school is that of pluralism which sees shareholders as one constituency among many and recognizes the  
 
 
                                                          
13 This can be seen in the way that many small and medium enterprises (SMMEs) in South Africa still attempt to comply with 
BBBEE measures even though they are mostly exempted from it. Bigger companies are indirectly requiring SMMEs to 
comply with BBBEE practices. For example Eskom (the national electricity provider) is increasingly stipulating that their 
procurement policies should specifically look at black owned and women owned SMMEs. In 2007 Eskom has allocated 17% 
of their budget for women owned SMME companies. Sven Lünsche It’s Too Little – Hardly Too Much, Financial Mail, 
(March 30, 2007) available at http://www.fm.co.za/cgi-bin/pp-print.pl (visited on May 20, 2008). 
14 Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal 1988 (2) SA 54 (T) at 65; Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979 (2) SA 116 
(W) at 130 and 151; Swanee’s Boerdery (Edms) Bpk (in Liquidation) v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1986 (2) SA 850 (A) at 854.  
15 See Len S Sealy, Directors’ Wider Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural, 13 Monash 
University Law Review 164, 166, 173 (1987) where he refers to this concept of the company, where the company is an object 
of directors’ duties, entirely perceived in terms of its members, as “corporate membership”. See also Michele K Havenga, 
The Company, the Constitution and the Stakeholders, 5 Juta’s Business Law 134, 136 (1997). This viewpoint was confirmed 
in the Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2.  
16 John H Farrar et al., Farrar’s Company Law 139-140 (3ed 1991) Butterworths; Hendrik S Cilliers & Marius L Benade, 
Corporate Law 139-140 (3ed 2000) Butterworths; Ron C Beuthin & Stephanie M Luiz, Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 199 
(3ed 2000) Butterworths  
17 Michele K Havenga, Directors’ Fiduciary Duties under our Future Company-law Regime, 9 South African Mercantile 
Law Journal 310, 312, 314 (1997). 
18 These were the terms used during the company law reform processes in South Africa and the United Kingdom. 
19 Francis Dawson, Acting in the Best Interest of the Company – For Whom are Directors’ Trustees, 11 New Zealand 
Universities Law Review 68, 81 (1984); the Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2.  
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interests of various groups.20 Thus, a company’s existence and success are seen as intertwined with the 
consideration of the interests of its employees and other potentially qualifying stakeholders in the business, such 
as suppliers and customers.21 
Esser and Du Plessis propose a “third” school of thought to determine the true meaning of “the company 
as a whole” and the beneficiaries of directors’ duties.22 A company is represented by several interests, including 
those of shareholders, employees and creditors. It is argued by Esser and Du Plessis that to require directors to 
act in good faith in the interests “of the company”, cannot mean anything else nowadays , but a blend of all these 
interests. First, directors should act in the best interests of the company as a separate legal entity. An interest that 
may be primary at one point in time in a company’s existence may be become secondary at a later stage.23 
Different weight need to be attached to the interests represented in a company. These interests and the level of 
weight attached to each of them may differ during the various stages of a company’s existence. The protection 
that these stakeholders receive in other legislation should play an important role when determining how much 
weight to attach to the different interests. It was therefore suggested by Esser and Du Plessis that directors should 
be aware of the protection offered to stakeholders in legislation other than company law legislation in order to 
know how to balance the competing interests of stakeholders.24  
The South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 does not enforce corporate social responsibility on 
companies. However, the South African King II Report on Corporate Governance addresses the need for the 
recognition of stakeholders’ interests by recommending that companies adopt a “triple-bottom line” approach.25 
This approach relates to the consideration of social, economic and environmental concerns when managing a 
company.26 In terms of the King II Report the shareholders (collectively) are still the most important beneficiary 
of directors’ fiduciary duties, but social, economic and environmental concerns should also be considered. The 
King II committee argued that by considering these factors the shareholders will usually benefit in any event. 27 
This confirms the viewpoint above that corporate social responsibility can include voluntary conduct as well as 
actions which are indirectly enforced through legislation. 
The Policy Document on company law reform also advocated that directors should manage a company in 
terms of the “triple-bottom line” approach. 28 Directors should consider the interests of stakeholders, but only 
when the shareholders collectively will benefit.29 Clause 91(1)(b) of the Companies Bill of 2007 deals with a 
director’s fiduciary duty to act in good faith. It is argued below that the Bill did not address this issue of 
stakeholder protection sufficiently. 
Clause 91(1)(b) of the Companies Bill of 2007 is relevant when evaluating which approach to the 
protection of stakeholders the drafters preferred.30 Clause 91(1)(b) states that “a director has a duty to act  
 
 
                                                          
20 Sealy supra at 173; Janice Dean, Stakeholding and Company Law, 22 The Company Lawyer 66 (2001); Lilian Miles, 
Company Stakeholders, 24 The Company Lawyer 56 (2003); the Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.2.  
21 Havenga (1997) (5) supra at 173; the Policy Document ch 3 pars 3.2.1-3.2.2; Lee Roach, The Paradox of the Traditional 
Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder Governance Protection: Expanding the Pluralist Approach, 22 The Company 
Lawyer 9 (2001). 
22 Irene-marie Esser & Jean J Du Plessis, The Stakeholder Debate and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 19 South African 
Mercantile Law Journal 346, 358 (2007). 
23 The interests of creditors may, for example, be more important than those of the shareholders when a company is nearing 
insolvency. 
24 See Esser & Du Plessis supra at 346, 358. Codes of best practice may be a possible way to achieve this and make sure that 
directors are informed of the protection that stakeholders receive in other legislation. 
25 See par 17.1 of the King II Report. See on the “triple-bottom line” approach Tshepo Mongalo, The Emergence of 
Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South Africa, 120 South African Law Journal 173, 177 (2003); 
Siyabonga Shandu, Shareholders’ Interests versus Social Demands: Incongruous Agendas, 26 Obiter 87 (2005); Michele K 
Havenga, Regulating Directors’ Duties and South African Company Law Reform, 26 Obiter 609, 618 (2005). 
26 The economic aspect of this approach concerns financial and non-financial aspects of the business of the company. The 
environmental aspect relates to the effect on the environment caused by the products or services of the specific company.  
27 King II Report par 17.1, Introduction. In addition to requiring listed companies to comply with King II the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) Limited also launched a Socially Responsible Investment Index (SRI Index) in May 2004. In terms of 
this Index the JSE developed criteria to measure the “triple-bottom line” performance of the FTSE/JSE All Share Index 
available at http://www.jse.co.za/sri/index.htm (visited on January 20, 2008). 
28 In 2004, a Policy Document on the guidelines for corporate law review was issued by the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry. The document envisaged an overall review of corporate laws in South Africa, comprising the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973, the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 and the common law relating to these corporate entities. 
29 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.3. 
30 See Irene-marie Esser, A Global Perspective on African Corporate Governance: The Protection of Stakeholders’ Interests, 
32 South African Yearbook of International Law 405, 406 ff (2007) for a discussion on the meaning of “the company” in 
terms of the Companies Bill of 2007. 
Journal of International  Commercial Law and Technology                Vol. 3, Issue 3 (2008)  
 161
 
 
honestly and in good faith, and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of, and for 
the benefit of, the company”.31  
The Companies Bill posed an ideal opportunity to clarify the meaning of “the company”. With the current 
drafting, it remains unclear whether directors should manage a company to the sole benefit of the shareholders or 
whether they should consider the interests of other stakeholders. It can be argued that the traditional viewpoint is 
still applicable due to the wording of the clause (“the company” has always been interpreted as meaning the 
shareholders collectively) and the Policy Document favoring the enlightened-shareholder value approach.32  
When the different remedy provisions are considered, it can be argued that the Companies Bill envisages 
a wider approach than the traditional position.33 All parties who are afforded a remedy, has an interest in the 
management of a company’s affairs. This category is wider than only shareholders. For example, clause 164 
states that a shareholder, creditor, or director of a company may apply to a court for relief if directors, inter alia, 
exercized their powers in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of the specific applicant.34  
This provision therefore provides creditors with a remedy to protect their own interests (as opposed to the 
interests of the company). This can be interpreted as indicating that directors have fiduciary duties towards 
creditors, thus changing the traditional common law viewpoint referred to above.35 
The question arises whether this changes the traditional common law viewpoint regarding the meaning of 
“the company” so that directors have to take into account these other interests (for example creditors) 
independently from those of the shareholders collectively. 
A clear definition of “the company” in the proposed new South African company legislation will 
eliminate this confusion. 36  
 
4.  Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment  
 
One of the major consequences of Apartheid was the deliberate exclusion of black people from meaningful 
participation in the economy. This culminated in limited access to proper education, skills development and 
employment opportunities for black people. In addition they lacked significant property and asset ownership.37 
Since 1995,  the South African government undertook a “multi-faceted” approach to address inequality 
which existed as a result of past discrimination. Despite the government’s efforts on black economic 
empowerment, change  has been slow. By 2005,whites (although they only made up 10% of the population) still 
controlled more than two-thirds of the companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 30% were owned 
by foreigners and only 4% were controlled by black people. Almost 60% of blacks were still regarded as poor, 
despite an emerging black middle class.38 Concern about this situation has also been expressed in the King II 
Report:  
 
Companies in South Africa… co-exist in an environment where many of the country’s citizens 
disturbingly are on the fringes of society’s economic benefits.39  
 
                                                          
31 Our emphasis. 
32 The Policy Document ch 3 par 3.2.3.  
33 Clauses 163, 164 and 166 in chapter 7, part B of the Companies Bill of 2007 deal with various rights to seek specific 
remedies. Clause 163 relates to an application to declare a director delinquent or to place a director under probation. A 
company, a shareholder, director, company secretary or other officer of a company, a registered trade union or other 
representative of the employees of a company, or the Commission or the Takeover Regulation Panel may apply to a court for 
an order declaring a person delinquent or under probation. Clause 166 relates to derivative actions. 
34 Our emphasis. See clause 164(1)(c) ) of the Companies Bill of 2007. 
35 Clauses 163 and 166 may also create confusion as to whom directors owe their duties to, although not as directly as is done 
in terms of clause 164. Clauses 163 and 166 only provide specific parties with certain remedies regarding the interests of the 
company, whereas clause 164 provides the parties concerned with remedies regarding their own interests. 
36 See, for example, s 172 of the United Kingdom’s Companies Act of 2006. This section clearly refers to the interests of 
different stakeholders. It is therefore clear what is meant by “the company”. The practical application of s 172 is, however, 
unclear. Proposed clauses are recommended by Esser & Du Plessis supra at 361 on directors’ duties. 
37 Paul Benjamin et al., Black Economic Empowerment: Commentary, Legislation & Charters (1)1-2 (2005). 
38 Jonathan Goldberg, Update on Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment, 44 Civil Engineering 114, 115 (26 Aug 2006). 
39 Tony Balshaw & Jonathan Goldberg, Cracking Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment: Codes & Scorecard 
Unpacked 44 (2005). The “triple-bottom line” approach interestingly enough also corresponds with one of the core values of 
the Constitution namely ubuntu which relates to basic humanity. According to ubuntu people can only be respected because 
they co-exist in harmony with other people. In the spirit of ubuntu a business cannot account for profit alone, it must also 
look at the people and environment within which it functions.  
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The foundations of BBBEE are found in the equality clause of the Constitution, which provides that 
everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.40 Section 9(2) of the 
Constitution specifically allows for legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.41 Various legislative tools exist to realize the right 
to equality as contained in section 9 of the Constitution, for example, the Employment Equity Act,42 the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act43 and the Skills Development Act.44 The BBBEE Act is also 
created with this aim in mind and forms the focus of this discussion. 
Black economic empowerment aims to bring about a significant increase in the numbers of black people 
that manage, own and control the country’s economy.  
 
The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment strategy is a necessary government intervention 
to address the systematic exclusion of the majority of South Africans from full participation in the 
economy. The defining feature of Apartheid was the use of race to restrict and severely control 
access to the economy by black persons. The accumulation process was one of restricted wealth 
creation and imposed underdevelopment on black communities to ensure that they were, in the 
main, suppliers of cheap labor.45 
 
5.  The Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
New pressure was put on companies to commit to black economic empowerment with the enactment of the 
BBBEE Act.46 It is seen as the “centerpiece” of the government’s policies to promote BBBEE.47  
                                                          
40 Section 9(1) of the South African Constitution. 
41 Section 217 of the South African Constitution also states that when state organs implement procurement policies, they may 
favour people who were disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
42 Act 55 of 1998. The Employment Equity Act provides for measures to remove all forms of discrimination in the workplace 
and ensures that so-called “designated groups” (i.e. women, disabled persons, African, Coloured and Indian people) are 
represented on all levels of organisation with “designated employers.” A designated employer means (a) an employer who 
employs 50 or more employees; (b) an employer who employs fewer that 50 employees, but has a total annual turnover that is 
equal to or above the applicable annual turnover of a small business in terms of Schedule 4 of the Act; (c) a municipality; (d) 
an organ of state, but excluding local spheres of government, the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency 
and the South African Secret Service; and (e) an employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of s 23 or s 31 of the 
Labour Relations Act, which appoints it as a designated employer in terms of this Act, to the extent provided for in the 
agreement.  
43 Act 5 of 2000. 
44 Act 97 of 1998. See, for example, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 and the Skills 
Development Act 97 of 1998. The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act provides a framework for the preferential 
procurement policies of government and its agencies. The effect is that an organ of State will apply a preferential point 
system before a tender is awarded. The better the racial composition of the contractor the higher the points that a contractor 
can obtain. This will ensure that contractors from previously disadvantaged background can benefit from state contracts. The 
purpose of the Skills Development Act is to provide a framework wherein the skills of the South African workforce can be 
developed and improved. The Act facilitates the integration of these strategies to improve skills within the National 
Qualifications Framework and also provides for learnerships that lead to recognised occupational qualifications. Skills 
development is financed by means of a levy-financing scheme and a national skills fund. It establishes a National Skills 
Authority as well as various sector education and training authorities (SETAs); labor centres; and the Skills Development 
Planning Unit to aid in this process. This Act plays an important role to enable previously disadvantaged groups to improve 
their training and qualifications and consequently improve their career opportunities. Also see Marlize van Jaarsveld, Black 
Economic Empowerment and Skills Development: A Success in Many Ways? 17 South African Mercantile Law Journal 261, 
266-267 (2005).  
45 See South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment available at 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/bee/bee.htm (visited at May, 22 2008) at par 2.2.1. (Hereafter the Strategy Document.) 
46 Act 53 of 2003. The Act came into force in 2004.  
47 Benjamin et al. supra at (1)1-2. Francois Marais & Lindi Coetzee, The Determination of Black Ownership in Companies 
for the Purpose of Black Economic Empowerment (Part 1), 27 Obiter, 112–115 (2006) hail the BBBEE Act and the 
Preferential Procurement Policy and Framework Act, 5 of 2000 as the “governments cornerstone acts”. Various other statutes 
also regulate the sphere of broad based black economic empowerment. Benjamin et al. supra at (1)3 provide a comprehensive 
list of all these legislation and include the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000, the State Tender Board 
Act 86 of 1968, the Framework for Supply Chain Management Regulation 2003 issued in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act 1 of 1999, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998, the Skills 
Development Levies Act 9 of 1999, the National Empowerment Fund Act 105 of 1998, the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
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The Act is structured in such a manner as to ensure that BBBEE will have a “knock-on” effect throughout 
the business supply chain. Ultimately businesses will in itself become drivers of BBBEE in the businesses of 
their suppliers and other stakeholders.48  
The BBBEE Act binds the public sector (i.e. Governmental departments, public entities or State-owned 
enterprises and organs of State) but also private entities to the extent which they would like to interact with the 
State.49  
The BBBEE Act contains the basic structure of black economic empowerment. The Act contains basic 
definitions, allows for the establishment of a Black Economic Empowerment Advisory Council,50 and allows for 
the issuing of a Strategy Document, Codes of Good Practice, and Transformation Charters.51 The Strategy 
Document contains Government’s BBBEE policy. It defines BBBEE and provides policy objectives and key 
principles.52  
The Codes of Good Practice are especially important. The Act provides the framework for BBBEE but 
the Codes contain the detailed regulations. These are discussed in more detail below.53 
The Act defines BBBEE as the economic empowerment of all black people (which include black women, 
workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas) through socio-economic strategies.54  
The objectives of the Act relate to the facilitation of BBBEE.55 This will be achieved by (a) promoting 
economic transformation in order to enable meaningful participation of black people in the economy; (b) 
achieving a substantial change in the racial composition of ownership and management structures and in the 
skilled occupations of existing and new enterprises; (c) increasing the extent to which communities, workers, 
cooperatives and other collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their 
access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training; (d) increasing the extent to which black women 
own and manage existing and new enterprises, and increasing their access to economic activities, infrastructure 
and skills training; (e) promoting investment programs that lead to broad-based and meaningful participation in 
the economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable development and general prosperity; (f) 
empowering rural and local communities by enabling access to economic activities, land, infrastructure, 
ownership and skills; and (g) promoting access to finance for BBBEE. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Certain specific sectoral legislation is included like the Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996, the Broadcasting Act 4 of 
1999, the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, the Gas Act 48 of 2001 and the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002. All these measures form an integrated framework and should be understood in relation to each 
other. Okechukwu C Iheduru, Black Economic Power and Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa, 42 Journal of 
Modern African Studies 1, 9 (March 2004) also includes the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act 4 of 2000, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 and the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. 
48 Balshaw & Goldberg supra at 25. 
49 This includes national or provincial departments, municipalities, Parliament, provincial legislatures and public entities. 
50 See ss 4-8. The Council has not yet been appointed. It is believed that this should happen in the near future since the final 
Codes have now been gazetted. See Benjamin et al. supra at 1. 
51 The Act allows for the development of a Transformation Charter for a particular sector of the economy by all major 
stakeholders in that particular industry, for example, the Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South 
African Mining Sector (GN 1639 in GG 26661 of 13 August 2004); Charter for the South African Petroleum and Liquid 
Fuels Industry on Empowering Historically Disadvantaged South African in the Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Industry (GN 
538 in GG 26293 of 26 April 2004); Construction Sector Charter of Black Economic Empowerment (GN 111 in GG 29616 of 
19 February 2007); Financial Sector Charter (issued Oct 2003); Forwarding and Clearing Industry Black Economic  
Empowerment Strategy; Maritime Transport and Service Industry BEE Charter; Tourism BEE Charter; Marketing, 
Advertising and Communication Charter. Also see Benjamin et al. supra at 4(1-181). Publication of these Charters in the 
Government Gazette is possible, provided that it has been developed by major stakeholders in that sector and it advances the 
objectives of the BBBEE Act (see Statement 010 Code 000). In some industries, in anticipation of the BBBEE Act, some 
sectors have drafted Transformation Charters which contain objectives and targets for a particular industry. Some of these 
have been gazetted. These Charters, even if they are gazetted will remain subject to the primary Codes 000 to 700. 
52 The current Strategy Document has not been issued in terms of section 11 of the BBBEE Act, but will probably form the 
basis of strategies which still need to be published. 
53 After promulgation of the BBBEE Act the so-called Phase 1 Codes (and Scorecards) were published. The Phase 1 Codes 
only dealt with the management and control element of BBBEE. The Phase 2 Codes then followed which dealt with the 
remainder of the generic scorecard elements. In February 2007 the Phase 1 & 2 Codes were gazetted along with the relevant 
generic scorecards. These codes are available at http://www.thedti.gov.za/bee/beecodes.htm (visited on May, 22 2008). 
54 Section 1 of the BBBEE Act. 
55 Section 2 of the BBBEE Act. 
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5.2   Codes of Good Practice 
 
The Codes of Good Practice contain the detail on BBBEE measures and provide the framework for measuring 
the progress made on the implementation and execution of BBBEE measures. The Department of Trade and 
Industry issued eights Codes of Good Practice each comprising of one or more Statements.56 
The most significant component of the Codes is the generic scorecard. Compliance with the Act is 
measured with reference to the generic scorecard. The generic scorecard is a balanced model document 
contained in Code 000 (Statement 000) which is applied to measure progress made in achieving BBBEE. The 
use of a common scorecard by different stakeholders provides a basic framework against which BBBEE progress 
in different enterprises and sectors can be measured.57 The basic framework contains 7 elements of BBBEE and a 
specific weighting is given to each element. These elements are (the weighting in terms of the scorecard appears 
in the adjacent brackets) namely, ownership58 (20 points), management and control59 (10 points), employment 
equity60 (15 points), skills development61 (15 points), preferential procurement62 (20 points), enterprise 
development63 (15 points), socio-economic development64 (5 points). 
From the weightings given to the various aspects of BBBEE in the generic scorecard the focus seems to 
be on direct empowerment through increased black ownership and control of enterprises and assets, increased 
black management at senior level, human resource development and employment equity (through the Skills 
Development Act and the Employment Equity Act). There is, however, another component of the BBBEE Act 
that does not always get the attention it deserves, namely indirect empowerment. Indirect empowerment is 
ensured in the BBBEE Act through preferential procurement, enterprise development, and corporate social 
investment.65 
The benefits for society associated with direct empowerment are quite obvious. Increased black 
ownership and control of enterprises and assets, increased black management at senior level, human resource 
development, employment equity and skills development will benefit the community at large. These direct 
empowerment elements make up 60% of the generic scorecard. 
 
                                                          
56 These are: Code 000: Framework for Measuring BBBEE [Statement 000 - General Principles and the Generic Scorecard, 
Statement 003 - Guidelines for the Development and Gazetting of Transformation Charters and Sector Codes, Statement 004 
- Scorecards for Specialized Enterprises]; Code 100: Measurement of the Ownership Element of BBBEE [Statement 100 - 
General Principles for Measuring Ownership, Statement 102 - Recognition of the Sale of Assets, the Recognition of Equity 
Equivalents for Multinational]; Code 200: Measurement of the Management Control Element of BBBEE [Statement 200 - 
General Principles for Measuring Managing Control]; Code 300: Measurement of the Employment Equity Element of 
BBBEE [Statement 400 - General Principles for Measuring Skills Development]; Code 500: Measurement of the Preferential 
Procurement Element of BBBEE [Statement 500 - General Principle for Measuring Preferential Procurement]; Code 600: 
Measurement of the Enterprise Development Element of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment [Statement 600 - 
General Principles for Measuring Enterprise Development]; Code 700: Measurement of the Socio-Economic Element of 
BBBEE [Statement 700 - General Principles for Measuring Socio-Economic Development]. The Code of Good Practice on 
BBBEE for Qualifying Small Enterprises is contained in Code 800 (Statements 800-807).  
57 Strategy for Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment as issued by the DTI, March 2003, Appendix A.  
58 In determining ownership the “flow through principle” has been applied, meaning that the natural chain of ownership must 
be followed to ensure a black natural person is a beneficiary. In the phase 2 Codes this is slightly modified and ownership is 
also determined by looking at economic interest and exercisable voting rights. These two together form an equity interest. See 
Stephanie Luiz & Kathleen Van Der Linde, Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment: Some Challenges in Measuring 
Ownership of Companies, 18 South African Mercantile Law Journal, 473-485, 476-483 (2006) for a discussion of problems 
arising from the application of the equity interest to measure ownership.  
59 This component measures the representivity of black people on senior top management and other top management levels. 
60 The Code dealing with this aspect aligns with the Employment Equity Act. It goes even further than the Employment 
Equity Act in that it sets targets for representivity at different levels of the business and for different categories of employees.  
61 This Code sets targets for employers for amounts to be spent on learnerships in terms of the Skills Development Act, and 
also aligns with this Act.  
62 Preferential procurement policies ensure that black owned professional service providers and entrepreneurs are used as 
suppliers.  
63 Enterprise development is aimed at setting up and growing viable enterprises that are majority owned by black operators 
while developing existing companies. 
64 Socio-economic development is quite broad and was previously the “residual element” in the scorecard (Phase 2 Code 700 
statement 700). It refers to schemes or projects that target infrastructural development or reconstruction in underdeveloped 
areas, rural areas etc. This can be made in terms of monetary transfers or by devoting time by staff of management to 
upliftment projects. 
65 See Strategy for Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment supra at Appendix A. Also see Benjamin et al. supra at 3(23-
25); Luiz & Van Der Linde supra at 475-476. 
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The indirect empowerment actions make up the remaining 40% of the scorecard. It is especially this part 
of the scorecard (and in particular socio-economic development) that can have an impact on the socio-economic 
upliftment of the greater black community. This can be illustrated with reference to the Transformation Charters 
where specific examples are given of ways to ensure socio-economic upliftment. For example, in terms of the 
Broad Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining Industry66 measures for 
improving the standard of housing of mine employees are provided. This includes the upgrading of hostels, 
conversions of hostels to family units and the promotion of home ownership options. Measures for improving 
nutrition of miners are also established. The Financial Sector Charter on Black Economic Empowerment67 talks 
about a targeted investment which refers to the financing of or investment in transformational infrastructure 
projects that support economic development in underdeveloped areas and contribute towards equitable access to 
economic resources. Such infrastructure projects could be in the transportation, telecommunications, water, and 
energy sectors. These types of projects will have a “knock-on” effect on the broader socio-economic 
environment of the country. 
The ultimate effect of the Act and Codes is that companies to which the Act applies will be given a Broad 
Based Black Economic status (which is determined by a so-called verification agency).68 This status will depend 
on the extent to which the company complies with the BBBEE Act and Codes. The status will determine the 
extent to which the company can function in the public and private sector. Companies with a good rating will 
obviously be able to benefit more from public sector work and procurement policies or as role players further 
down in the supply chain.There are various levels of BBBEE status are set out in Code 000 Statement 000 
ranging from a level 1 contributor through to a level 8 contributor.69  
Companies with annual revenue of less than R5m are exempted from compliance with the Codes, while 
those with a turnover between R5m and R35m are judged by a separate and more lenient scorecard.70 In effect 
only companies with a turnover above R35 million are compelled to comply with the scorecard. The final Codes 
published in terms of the BBBEE Act also give leniency to small and medium enterprises. They have a less strict 
scorecard to comply with. It is believed that this leniency was necessary to ensure that this sector continues with 
job creation. Currently, 80%-85% of all new jobs are created in this sector.71 
 
6.0  Impact of Black Economic Empowerment Legislation on Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
6.1 Interplay between Corporate Social Responsibility and Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment 
 
Corporate social responsibility amounts to more than mere philanthropic efforts by companies. It entails the 
responsibility of each company for its effect on the society in which it operates.72 A company is a separate legal 
entity that can only act through individuals.73 Since company directors carry out managerial functions and 
responsibilities on behalf of the company, they are subject to various duties. These duties include statutory duties 
in terms of the Companies Act,74 other legislation and common law duties.75 Corporate social responsibility  
 
 
                                                          
66 Available at http://www.dme.gov.za/minerals/mining_charter.stm (visited on May 20, 2008). 
67 Available at http://www.fscharter.co.za/page.php?p_id=1 (visited on May 20, 2008). 
68 Par 10, Statement 000. The DTI must issue clear guidelines on the verification process. The South African National 
Accreditation System (SANAS) currently conducts accreditation of BBBEE verification agencies and it must also develop 
and maintain criteria in this regard. The DTI encourages the establishment of an Independent Industry Body that will provide 
guidance to the verification industry through the development and maintenance of high quality and reliable BBBEE 
verification services. 
69 Level 1 is the highest level of compliance. A level 1 contributor scores more than 100 points on the generic scorecard and 
has a 135% black economic empowerment recognition level. See par 8 of the Code 000 Statement 000. 
70 Lünsche supra at 2. 
71 SMME’s are further indirectly supported by the Act in that companies which assist and support enterprise development can 
claim 15% of the BBBEE Code Points. The scorecard also provides for 15 points out of a maximum of 100 for contributing 
to socio-economic development and for backing black owned business. 
72 Derek French, Stephan W Mayson, & Christopher L Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 24ed (2007-2008) 
Oxford UP. 
73 Havenga (1997) 5 supra at 134; Cilliers & Benade supra at 5, 115-163; Beuthin & Luiz supra at 179. See also Regulation 
59 of Table A of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 in Schedule 1 that states: “the business of the company shall be managed by 
its directors.”  
74 For example ss 234-251 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.  
75 Irene-marie Esser & Johan Coetzee, Codification of Directors’ Duties, 12 Juta’s Business Law 26 (2004); Esser (2007) 32 
supra at 406.  
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therefore requires that directors also include interests other than just that of the shareholders when managing a 
company.76  
In South Africa the economic and socio-economic landscape has drastically been transformed since the 
dawn of democracy more than a decade ago. This transformation can not be achieved by the State alone. Private 
role players, such as companies, also have a responsibility to assist with transformation of the country to rid it 
from the scars of Apartheid. This much needed involvement is not left to voluntary projects by companies, but is 
also compelled through legislation.  
The BBBEE Act forces companies and directors of companies to consider all stakeholders. Compliance 
with the Act will also benefit the shareholders indirectly. If a company falls under the scope of application of the 
Act and does not properly comply with the prescribed black economic empowerment scorecard the company will  
receive a poor BBBEE rating which will negatively affect its ability to do business in South Africa. This will 
directly impact on the interests of the shareholders.  
It is undeniable that BBBEE and good corporate governance overlap. This overlap is especially unique in 
the South African context due to the political past of the country and the need for socio-economic upliftment. 
The BBBEE Act forces companies, directly or indirectly, to consider the broader South African community 
within its political and socio-economic context. First, on a direct level, a BBBEE strategy of a company will 
ensure an increase in black participation (on the level of ownership, management, expertise and control) in all 
levels of the company. The strategy can also increase the extent to which rural and local communities, workers, 
co operatives and women own and manage existing enterprises and develop new enterprises, as well as increase 
their access to economic resources, activities, infrastructure and skills training. It also develops appropriate 
human resources and skills. Secondly, on an indirect level, preferential procurement, involvement in enterprise 
development and socio-economic upliftment projects will ensure that the community at large reaps the benefits 
of corporate socially responsible conduct. The effect of BBBEE will therefore filter through to the community at 
large and the country. This amounts to compliance with the “triple-bottom line”. All BBBEE measures will 
qualify as socially responsible conduct, while all socially responsible conduct will not necessarily amount to 
BBBEE measures. In the South African business environment these two aspects should therefore be viewed as 
inter-linked and not as two separate issues. This is illustrated by Figure 1 below. 
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FIGURE 1: Illustration of interplay between corporate social responsibility and broad based black economic empowerment 
 
                                                          
76 The relationship between a company and a director of that company is an example of a commercial fiduciary relationship. 
A director can be seen as an agent, due to the fact that the director does not act on his or her own behalf, but on behalf of the 
company. A director can also be regarded as a trustee since he does not own company assets, but controls the assets and 
exercises powers for the benefit of the company rather than for his own benefit. Nevertheless, the relationship between a 
director and a company remains unique. Categorizing directors as agents or trustees is intended to prove the existence of a 
fiduciary duty rather than to equate directors with those particular positions. A company directorship is generally regarded as 
one of the most complex fiduciary offices. Michele K Havenga, Breach of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Liability on what 
Basis, 8 South African Mercantile Law Journal 366 (1996). Also see Sibex Construction (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Injectaseal CC at 
65C; Dawson supra at 68, 80; Beuthin & Luiz supra at 192. 
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6.2  Concerns regarding Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
 
BBBEE (as is the case with good corporate governance) is not always met with enthusiasm. Some argue that 
although the recognition of all stakeholders in an enterprise sounds attractive, the scope of directional discretion 
will have to be widened, to allow directors to take into consideration all stakeholders’ interests. This will mean 
that structural checks and balances would have to be implemented to counteract against widened powers of 
directors.77 
Concerns have also been raised that BBBEE will put an unnecessary burden on companies. On the 
contrary, it has indeed been found that companies with a higher BBBEE score have had a greater improvement in 
their profit margins.78  
International investors are also often weary of BBBEE in fear of the fact that ownership transfers to 
previously disadvantaged groups will lead to value dilution of the company shares. It should be remembered that 
multinational companies have been exempted from the ownership element of the scorecard. These fears can be 
addressed by linking BBBEE to good corporate governance. Companies will be able to illustrate to investors that 
the majority of black economic empowerment objectives are closely linked to good corporate governance, which 
is a familiar topic in the business arena.79 
 
6.3  Evaluation of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
 
BBBEE has given new momentum to the South African economy over the past few years. This can be seen from 
the volume of BBBEE transactions carried out over the past decade.80 Completed BBBEE transactions to date 
represent in excess of R200 billion (US$25 billion). In 2007 alone, there were 153 transactions totaling R96 
billion (US$12 billion).81 In the last four years BBBEE has become the dominant feature on the mergers and 
acquisitions landscape in South Africa.82 High volumes of corporate activity are still expected to continue over 
the next five to seven years, which will have a positive impact on the South African economy.83 
It is still too early to determine whether BBBEE has had the intended impact on the community. From the 
size of the deals and amounts spent it is evident that gestures to this effect have been made. Compliance with 
BBBEE legislation is monitored on the basis of a tick-box. In other words, compliance is determined by asserting 
whether the company complied with certain criteria, in this case the 7 elements on the generic scorecard. The 
success and effect of these good corporate governance actions on society are still to be determined.84  
The potential effectiveness of this tool can be seen from the several important BBBEE transactions in 
2005. For example Tiger Brands (a food conglomerate) struck a deal in terms of which 4% of its shares (worth 
R729m) will be transferred within the next 10 years to its staff who are 80% black. Edcon (a retail conglomerate) 
set aside R455m for a staff empowerment scheme. Mvela Group acquired 25% of the health care group Afrox. 
Old Mutual, Nedcor and Mutual & Federal increased black shareholding by 12,75% in a R7,2bn deal for the 
benefit of black controlled entities owned by black clients. ABSA sold 10% to a consortium led by Mvelaphanda 
Holdings. Standard Bank and the Liberty Group sold 10% worth R5,6bn to Tutuwa Consortium.85 
                                                          
77 Alistair Alcock, Corporate Governance: A Defence Against the Status Quo, 58 Modern Law Review 898, 907, 912 (1995) 
argues further that a firm that operates according to a board where various stakeholders are represented is a “recipe for 
disaster”. 
78 Economic Empowerment Rating Agency (Empowerdex) Impact of BBBEE Implementation on Profit Margin and 
Productivity Report (2007) available at http://www.empowerdex.co.za/content/Default.aspx (visited on May 20, 2008).  
79 African Institute of Corporate Citizenship Why We Need to Link BEE to CSR? Business Day (Jan 24, 2005) at 4. 
80 According to Ernst & Young’s Mergers and Acquisitions 2004 Review, in 2004 BBBEE transactions increased by 29% to 
244 from 189 the previous year. The average BBBEE deal value increased from R42,2 billion in 2003 to R52,9 billion in 
2004. (See Fin24.com BEE to Drive Corporate Activity (May 16, 2008) available at 
http://www.fin24.com/articles/default/display_article.aspx?ArticleId=1518-1786_2323546 (visited on May 22, 2008)). 
81 South Africa The Good News BEE Transactions Drive Domestic Corporate Activity (May 19, 2008) available at 
http://www.sagoodnews.co.za/bee/bee_transactions_drive_domestic_corporate_activity.html (visited on May 21, 2008). 
82 See Fin24.com supra. 
83 The top ten BBBEE transactions for 2006 were: (1) Acquisition of 10% of FirstRand by BEE Consortium R7,895 billion, 
(2) Sale by Thintana of 15.1% of Telkom to the Elephant Consortium R6,600 billion, (3) Acquisition of 7.6% of Standard 
Bank by Tutuwa R4,140 billion, (4) Sale of 18% of Lonplats to Incwala R3,187 billion, (5) Acquisition of 25% of Uhambo 
Oil R3,000 billion, (6) Acquisition of 4.8% of MTN by Umthunzi Telecoms Consortium R2,500 billion, (7) JCI unbundling 
R1,840 billion, (8) Merger of Rebserve and Mvelaphanda R1,546 billion, (9) Nail unbundling R1,428 billion, (10) Pelawan 
Investments/ Anooraq Resources Corporation merger R1,276 billion. See Empowerdex supra. 
84 See Ben Pettet, The Combined Code: A Firm Place for Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance, 13 The Company Lawyer 
394-400 (1998) on the dangers of box-ticking. 
85 Balshaw & Goldberg supra at 116. 
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During the initial stages of BBBEE fears existed that only a small group of the black population will reap 
the benefits of BBBEE resulting in the formation of a so-called “black middle class or elite”.86  
In order to address this issue the BBBEE Act has been published, which specifically aims to ensure that 
empowerment reaches the broad black community.87 
It is also believed that the revised Codes have already gone a long way in ensuring that black economic 
empowerment will be broad based. The Codes make provision for broad based ownership schemes and employee 
schemes. Special incentives also exist for schemes involving black women, black new entrants and black 
designated groups including workers, unemployed people, the youth, aged people, people with disabilities and 
people living in rural areas.88 
Despite optimism about the impact of BBBEE (as a component of good corporate governance) on the 
country’s economic and socio-economic development, it should not be viewed as a magical quick-fix solution to 
the country’s problems.  
 
BEE is not the holy grail that will transform any type of metal into gold by itself. However, what 
is certain is that hard and/or smart work will transform the bottom line of companies with BEE 
being an important catalyst.89 
 
Although racial redress in corporate ownership does not really form part of the traditional concept of 
corporate social responsibility, as discussed in paragraph 2 above, it comprises an important element thereof in 
South Africa. The BBBEE Act illustrates that social change (in this case the correction of racial imbalances in 
participation of the economy) can be pursued by means other than company law.90 
 
7.  Conclusion and Summary  
 
Ten years ago many companies did not have CSR policies let alone BEE policies and strategies. 
Many companies now want to go beyond simply complying with regulations. This is a new 
concept for cooperation. It has developed because of a growing national and international 
awareness of corporation’s responsibility to their stakeholders and larger society.91  
 
The BBBEE Act illustrates how the State, through legislation can compel companies to have a social 
conscience. This compulsion by the State has interestingly enough proven to be more successful in effecting 
social change than mere market forces have been up to now.92  
In terms of South African company law directors have to manage a company in the best interests of the 
shareholders collectively. The King II Report and the Policy Document on company law reform recommended 
that directors should also consider the interests of other stakeholders when they manage a company. It is stated in 
the Policy Document that:  
 
                                                          
86 South Africa’s black middle class has grown by 30% between 2006 and 2007. Their collective spending power rose from R130-
billion to R180-billion. 12% of South Africa’s black population account for over half (54%) of all black buying power. University of 
Cape Town’s Unilever Institute of Strategic Marketing and TNS Research Surveys, Black Diamond Study 2007: SA's Booming Black 
Middle Class available at http://www.unileverinstitute.co.za/index.php?Itemid=34&id=72&option=com_content&task=view (visited 
on May 22, 2008). 
87 The term broad based is defined in terms of the act as: the economic empowerment of all black people including women, workers, 
youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies that include, 
but are not limited to (a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets; (b) 
facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, workers, co-operatives and other 
collective enterprises; (c) human resource and skills development; (d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce; (e) preferential procurement; and (f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by 
black people. (See s 1 of the BBBEE Act). 
88 Fears also exist that BBBEE will result in black token empowerment. The BBBEE Act specifically prohibits fronting practices. 
Fronting is defined as “any practice or initiative which are in contravention of or against the spirit of any law, provision, rule, 
procedure, process, system, policy, practice, directive, order or any other term or condition pertaining to black economic 
empowerment under the codes”. Examples of fronting practices are window dressing, benefit diversion, opportunistic intermediaries. 
(Code 000 Statement 100). See Benjamin et al. supra at (1)8 & 42-43 and Balshaw & Goldberg supra at 24. 
89 Vuyo Jack BEE Success Comes with Work and Life’s Cycles Business Report (September 24, 2006) available at 
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=2512&fArticleId=3449596 (visited on May 22, 2008). 
90 JL Levin, Considering the Legitimacy of Government Measures to Introduce Black Economic Empowerment Legislation, 18 South 
African Mercantile Law Journal, 388-392, 392 (2006); Havenga (2005) supra at 615. 
91 Benjamin et al. supra at (1)3-4. 
92 Benjamin et al. supra at (1) 27. See par 2 supra on the role of law in voluntary corporate social responsibility. Market forces 
referred to in the context above include for example sanctions under Apartheid, consumer groups, trade unions etcetera.   
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[C]ompanies and governments alike are increasingly aware that higher standards of corporate 
governance and ethics are required and that there should be greater interdependence between 
enterprises and the societies in which they operate.93  
 
The draft Companies Bill of 2007 is unclear on the preferred approach to stakeholder protection. It seems, 
however, if the Bill also favors the enlightened-shareholder value approach where shareholders are still the main  
beneficiaries of directors’ duties, but interests of other stakeholders may be taken into account when directors 
make business decisions. 
While consideration of the “triple-bottom line” is still voluntary in terms of present South African 
company law the South African legislator has stepped in through the BBBEE Act forcing directors to consider 
more than the interests of the shareholders collectively. The BBBEE Act does not only address racial imbalances 
but also to a limited extent looks at socio-economic upliftment. The effect of the BBBEE Act is that companies 
and directors are forced to take into account the interests of the previously disadvantaged South Africans into 
account.  
The BBBEE Act is but one example of the use of legislation to guide the corporate conscience. The Act 
confronts companies with the political and socio-economic reality in the country within which they operate and 
involves them in the process of reform and reconciliation. It is crucial that the corporate conscience and 
Government efforts for reforms are combined and coordinated to ensure that it functions to the benefit of the 
country at large.  
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93 At par 3.1 & 3.2. 
